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This paper takes a language ecology perspective (Haugen, 1972; Hornberger, 
2003) and uses Cooper’s language planning framework for status planning, ac-
quisition planning and corpus planning (1989) to provide an overview analysis of 
language policy and planning (LPP) in Taiwan since the 17th century. The paper 
investigates how languages have interacted with one another and with their socio-
cultural and political contexts, and how different policies at different times have 
altered the local language ecology. Three emerging factors that are changing the 
local ecology are further identified. As the first step to successful LPP is a detailed 
understanding of the local language ecology (Kaplan & Baldauf, 2008), it is hoped 
that the analysis presented here will provide insights for future LPP in Taiwan.
Introduction
This paper takes a language ecology perspective and uses Cooper’s language 
planning framework (1989) to discuss language policy and planning (LPP) in Tai-
wan since the 17th century. Traditionally, LPP has been understood as conscious 
efforts, usually at the governmental level to change the language behaviors of 
some groups for some reasons during a certain period of time. The question of 
“who plans what for whom and how” posed by Cooper (1989, p. 31) and further 
elaborated by Haarmann (1990, p. 123) as “who is engaged in planning what lan-
guage for whom and why (emphasis original)” is helpful in examining various 
LPP across different contexts. A closer look at each interrogative suggests that al-
though the agents of LPP (i.e., who) were originally conceived as a small number 
of powerful elites, more recent studies have argued a wider number of stakehold-
ers are involved in LPP (e.g., Ricento & Hornberger, 1996). With respect to what 
is being planned, Cooper’s framework provides useful guidance to explore what 
aspects of language can be, and usually are planned, namely, status planning, cor-
pus planning and acquisition planning. Following Kloss (1969), Cooper (1989)de-
fines status planning as “deliberate efforts to influence the allocation of functions 
among a community’s language” (p. 99). When desired communicative functions 
are identified, selection of forms follows, which include graphization, standard-
ization, modernization and renovation of a language. This process of designing 
linguistic forms is what Cooper bases on Kloss (1969) and refers to as corpus plan-
ning. In addition to status and corpus planning, Cooper (1989) defines a third type 
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as acquisition planning, “organized efforts (e.g., providing more opportunities or in-
centives) to promote the learning of a language.” (p. 157)
The question for whom the LPP aims draws attention to different levels of people 
affected, ranging from individuals, families, schools, communities to nations or even be-
yond national borders. Importantly, Ricento and Hornberger (1996) have argued that 
people whom the LPP aim to influence are not passive, but are constantly involved in 
shaping the language policy, whether consciously or unconsciously, and thus people 
at all levels can be agents for social changes in their local contexts. Finally, the question 
of how and why certain LPP is carried out has been the center of LPP research. While 
different approaches (e.g., ethnographic, geolinguistic, psycho-sociological, to name a 
few) have been adopted to provide descriptions and/or explanations for LPP across 
different contexts and among those, this paper will adopt an ecological perspective to 
discuss LPP in Taiwan.  
Hornberger (2006) notes that the concept of language ecology (or linguistic ecol-
ogy, the ecology of language, ecolinguistics) has drawn increasing attention among 
LPP scholars. When Haugen (1972, p. 325) developed the notion of language ecology, 
he defined it as “the study of the interactions between any given language and its en-
vironment.” Fill and Muhlausler (2001, p. 3) reason that language ecology is a useful 
metaphor to examine “the diversity of inhabitants of an ecology” and “the functional 
interrelationships between the inhabitants of an ecology.” It also helps identify essen-
tial factors that sustain the diversity. Hornberger (2003) further identifies three key 
themes of the language ecology metaphor based on previous work in the field: lan-
guage evolution, language environment, and language endangerment. She proposes 
that languages, like living species, evolve, grow, change, live, become endangered, or 
even die under the influences of other languages and the environments in which they 
are situated. Hornberger suggests that the metaphor contributes to our understanding 
of the mutual relationships between languages, their interaction within their socio-po-
litical, economic, and cultural environments, and how lack of sufficient environmental 
support might lead to language endangerment. 
Building on the notion of language ecology, this paper aims to provide an 
overview analysis of the language ecology in Taiwan since the 17th century with 
respect to (1) how languages have interacted with one another and with their so-
ciocultural and political contexts within the language ecology, and (2) how and 
why different policies at different times have altered the language ecology in Taiwan. 
The paper begins with an overview of Taiwan’s ethnolinguistic composition and so-
cio-historical context, and moves to its early colonial experiences and its short period 
of integration to the Qing Dynasty in the 17th century. It then reviews the Japanese 
colonial period (1895-1945), the Kuomingtang (KMT) period, which witnessed a tran-
sition from hard authoritarian control to the advent of democracy (1945-2000), and the 
contemporary modern democratic period (2000-2008). The paper concludes with a 
brief assessment of some emerging factors that are changing the language ecology in 
current Taiwan and will affect future LPP in Taiwan. 
Ethnolinguistic Composition and Socio-historical Context of Taiwan
Taiwan is comprised of one major island and several smaller offshore islands 
in the west Pacific Ocean, and is located less than 100 miles across the Taiwan Strait 
from the coastal Chinese provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. In an area slightly 
larger than the states of Delaware and Maryland combined, inhabits a popula-
tion of over 22.9 million (Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2008). Currently, around 
98 percent of the population is of Han descent, and the remaining two percent is 
of Austronesian descent.  While the Han descendents can be furthered divided 
into three ethnic groups: the Holo (70%), the Hakka (10-15%), and the Mainlander 
(13%), the Austronesian descendents are comprised of 13 different tribes (Cop-
per, 2003). Although the population figures are only an approximation since there 
has been substantial intermarriage across different groups since the 1980s (Dreyer, 
2003), the concept of the “four great ethnic groups” has been an important compo-
nent of discourse dealing with ethnic and national issues in contemporary Taiwan 
(Makeham, 2005). This concept is also of significance in the development of con-
temporary LPP in Taiwan as much of recent LPP focus has been on the languages 
associated with the four ethnic groups (Scott & Tiun, 2007).
The official name of Taiwan is the Republic of China (ROC), which was estab-
lished in 1912 in China after the Qing Dynasty was overthrown. The language spo-
ken near Beijing, the Mandarin variety, was chosen as the official language of the 
ROC in 1912; it became the official language for Taiwan in 1945, when the nation-
alist party, the Kuomingtang (KMT), retreated from China to Taiwan after it was 
defeated by the communist party. The KMT resumed the name of ROC as well as 
its official language in Taiwan until the present day. Mandarin Chinese has been a 
lingua franca for Taiwan since 1945, but Holo (also known as Southern Min or Hok-
kien) is spoken by around 73% of the people in Taiwan, and thus is often referred 
to as Taiwanese. Hakka is spoken by roughly 10% of the population, and at least 13 
different indigenous languages are spoken by different tribes of Austronesian ab-
originals (Taiwan Government Information Office, 2008). With their origins in the 
Fujian and Guangdong provinces of China, Holo and Hakka have been commonly 
viewed as dialects of Chinese, although Holo, Hakka and Mandarin Chinese are 
all mutually unintelligible. In this paper, the term “local languages” refers to Holo, 
Hakka, and Austronesian languages, which all have a longer and more indigenous 
history than Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan.
The Dutch/Spanish Colonization and Qing Dynasty Era
Research in linguistics, anthropology and archaeology has suggested that Tai-
wan’s earliest inhabitants were the Austro-Polynesians, and Taiwan might be the 
homeland for the vast Austronesian speech community because of the diversity 
exhibited among the Austronesian languages in Taiwan (Li, 1995). However, large-
scale immigration did not take place until the 17th to the early 20th centuries due 
to political and economic chaos in China (Taiwan Government Information Office, 
2008). During this period of time, the Manchu invaded China, overthrowing the 
Ming Dynasty and establishing the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). The political turmoil 
pushed many Han people, especially those living in the coastal provinces, to leave 
for Taiwan over time. At that time, Taiwan was colonized by the Dutch (1624-1662) 
in the south and the Spanish (1626-1642) in the north. In 1642, the Dutch drove out 
the Spanish and took over Taiwan, and their demands for more labor further drew 
increasing numbers of Han people to migrate to Taiwan (Dreyer, 2003). During the 
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Dutch colonization, the Austronesian aboriginals were the majority, and some of 
the Austronesian languages were romanized by the missionaries accompanying 
the Dutch colonizers. The missionaries gave sermons in and translated the Bible 
and many religious books into the Austronesian languages. In 1636, the first school 
in Taiwan was established by the missionaries to teach Christianity as well as the 
reading and writing of Siraya, an Austronesian variety that was promoted by the 
Dutch as the lingua franca in the south (M. Chen, 1996). Several religious schools 
were established in the subsequent years, many of which taught the Austrone-
sian languages in addition to Christianity, reflecting missionaries’ views that local 
languages were more efficient for educational and proselytizing purposes than 
Dutch (Heyle, 2009). Importantly, the use of the Siraya writing system went be-
yond the original missionary purposes as it was later used in contract writing and 
documentations among the aboriginals and Han people for over a hundred years, 
long after the Dutch left Taiwan (Tsao, 2000). Since the colonizers’ major inten-
tions were commerce and conversion to Christianity (Chiung, 2000), their LPP was 
“not particularly oppressive and discriminatory” (ibid, p. 61); rather it was “prag-
matic” (Tse, 2000, p. 155). In general, Austronesian languages did not seem to be 
threatened by the colonizer’s language (i.e., Dutch) in the local language ecology 
of this time under its pragmatic LPP orientation. In fact, some of them were even 
preserved through romanization.
 In 1662, the Dutch colonizers were driven out by troops led by Zheng 
Cheng-gong, a general in the Ming Dynasty and an important leader of the 
anti-Qing movement, ending their 38 years of colonization in Taiwan. Zheng’s 
family used Taiwan as a military base with the hope of re-conquering the main-
land some day. During their twenty-one year control in Taiwan, they estab-
lished the first Confucian temple devoted to the cult of Confucius and many 
Chinese-style schools that introduced Chinese customs and traditions to Tai-
wan (Dreyer, 2003). Since Zheng was a Holo speaker from the Fujian province, 
most of his followers were also Holo speakers from that region. Holo was the 
predecessor of what is known as Taiwanese today, and it started to diverge 
from its origin in China as it integrated lexicon from Dutch and Austronesian 
languages (Dong, 1998). Later, in 1683, the Qing Dynasty defeated Zheng’s re-
gime and loosely incorporated Taiwan into the Fujian province. Although the 
Qing Dynasty banned Chinese emigration to Taiwan, Holo and Hakka speak-
ers from the Fujian and Guangzhou provinces continued to move to the is-
land. Gradually, Holo speakers became the majority group followed by a much 
smaller population of Hakka speakers, who oftentimes were driven to become 
bilingual in Holo and Hakka (S. Chen, 2006). 
The Qing Dynasty initially neglected Taiwan due to its remoteness from the 
mainland, but started to pay more attention to Taiwan when its abundant natural 
resources had drawn the increasing interest of foreign powers, especially Japan. In 
1885, the Qing Dynasty made Taiwan one of its provinces and began to establish in-
frastructure in Taiwan. It also established many schools, and some of them aimed at 
teaching Chinese culture and language to the aboriginals (Dreyer, 2003). As a conse-
quence, many aboriginals learned Chinese orthography and gradually ceased to use 
the Romanized systems (Tsao, 2000). Although Mandarin was the language of the 
officials from the Dynasty, the majority of the local people spoke Holo or Hakka. 
Therefore, it was common for schools, private or public, to teach classical Chinese 
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using local languages as the medium of instruction (Scott & Tiun, 2007). 
In summary, the Dutch’s pragmatic orientation to languages helped promote 
some Austronesian languages through religious education and romanization of 
the Austronesian languages. During the Zheng period, Holo became the language 
of the regime since Holo speakers were the majority. The establishment of schools 
further promoted Holo within the local language ecology. In the early Qing Dynas-
ty era, there were few conscious attempts to intervene in the language ecology in 
Taiwan, but growing foreign interests in Taiwan led the Dynasty to make stronger 
efforts to manage Taiwan, setting up schools as one of these measures. The Chi-
nese language was introduced through schooling, and it gradually replaced the 
use of the Romanized writing systems among the aboriginals. Meanwhile, Manda-
rin Chinese started to gain some presence in the local ecology, but Holo remained 
the dominant language of the time, followed by Hakka.
It should be noted that LPP during the Dutch colonization, Zheng’s regime 
and the Qing Dynasty was less explicitly enacted in documentation and accom-
plished implicitly through the establishment of schools. Although the first schools 
set up by the missionaries during the Dutch colonization were meant for religious 
purposes, they helped promote the Austronesian languages in the local ecology. 
The Chinese-style schools founded during the Zheng’s regime were authoritative 
attempts to introduce Chinese traditions and values to Taiwan, and since Holo 
was used as a medium of instruction, schools became part of an organized ef-
fort to affect the local language ecology. More schools were further established 
during the Qing Dynasty. Some that introduced Chinese culture and language to 
the aboriginals eventually changed their literacy practices. As one reviewer suc-
cinctly points out, although LPP during these periods was embedded in schooling 
policies that ultimately affected languages, the measures taken were primarily fo-
cused on goals other than language (i.e., religious conversion or the introduction 
of Chinese culture). However, as this paper will soon demonstrate, more explicit 
language measures were taken in the regimes that followed.  
Japanese Colonization Era (1895-1945)
Taiwan was ceded to Japan and became its colony after the Qing Dynasty was 
defeated in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, at which point immigration from China 
was prohibited. Policies of Japanization were adopted to turn local people into 
loyal subjects of the emperor. The Japanization policies were closely linked to the 
three stages of educational planning, which moved gradually from pacificatory 
toward oppressive orientations (Tsao, 2000; Tse, 2000): (1) during the period from 
1895 to 1919, private Chinese schools were still tolerated since the Japanese, ethnic 
Chinese, and the Austronesian natives attended different school systems. Mean-
while, the Japanese government encouraged local people to send their children 
to the public elementary schools set up by the Japanese around the island, which 
taught Chinese as a required subject; (2) during the period from 1919-1937, pri-
vate Chinese schools were no longer permitted and Chinese became an optional 
school subject. Since then, the enrollment rate for public elementary school chil-
dren had risen steadily, from 25.1% in 1920 to 71.3% in 1943 (Tsao, 1999); (3) during 
the last eight years of Japanese colonization (1937-1945), Chinese and other local 
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languages were prohibited in all public domains. Moreover, when the wars be-
tween China and Japan intensified, the Japanese government launched an “only-
Japanese-speaking families” campaign in 1938, which aimed to intrude Japanese 
upon language use in the family domain, often considered the base for language 
maintenance (M. Chen, 1996). Under such a discriminatory language policy, lo-
cal languages were seriously damaged, and Taiwan gradually became a diglossic 
society with Japanese as the High official language of administration, education, 
and prestige and local languages as Low languages of family and local commerce 
(Tsao, 1999; Scott & Tiun, 2007). The language policy was successful in that an 
estimated 51% of the population understood Japanese in 1940, and by 1944, the 
percentage rose to 71% (Huang, 1993). 
Ironically, the fact that Japanese became a common language through its 
exclusive use in the educational and public domains helped to foster a sense of 
“Taiwanese identity” among the colonized who all experienced systematic so-
cial discrimination (Dreyer, 2003; Huang, 2000; Scott & Tiun, 2007). During the 
1920s and 1930s, many Taiwanese elites were engaged with a series of Chinese 
language reforms focused on the enhancement of Taiwanese culture and resis-
tance to Japanese imperialism. The reforms were influenced by the Taiwanese stu-
dents in Tokyo and Japanese scholars sympathetic to the fate of Taiwan, as well as 
by Taiwanese students in China who witnessed the Literary Revolution in which 
vernacular Chinese was adopted as the new literacy medium (Haylen, 1999). The 
solidification of a common Taiwanese identity and intellectual discussions associ-
ated with it eventually led to the Taiwanese literature movement, enabling some 
local languages, especially Holo, to be used in writing. It is also during this period 
that Holo in Taiwan became even more distinct from its origin in China as it bor-
rowed many words and grammatical features from Japanese (Scott & Tiun, 2007). 
Thus, Japanese, though introduced to the language ecology in Taiwan much later 
than other languages, spread rapidly and became the language of prestige through 
various political and educational measures that promoted Japanese learning at the 
cost of other languages. However, the oppressive Japanese language policies also 
led to the emergence of a common local identity. 
Kuomingtang Era (1945-1999)
A defeated nation in World War II, Japan returned Taiwan to the ROC in 1945, 
at that time under the Kuomingtang (KMT) control. Four years later, the KMT was 
defeated by the communist party (which later established the People’s Republic 
of China in Beijing in 1949) during a series of civil wars and retreated to Taiwan. 
Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT government brought over one million people from all 
parts of China to Taiwan, speaking various Chinese dialects. This group of im-
migrants was often known as Mainlanders (waishengren 外省人, literally “out-
side-province person”), as opposed to local people (benshengren 本省人, literally 
“original-province person”), who came to Taiwan before the KMT troops Upon 
their arrival, Chiang’s troops seized local people’s property, destroyed local infra-
structure and economy, and created tensions between local natives and Mainland-
ers. The accumulating tensions eventually burst into demonstrations across the 
island. Chiang used this incident to suffocate dissent in Taiwan, and thousands of 
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intellectuals were killed. This incident is known as 228 (February 28, 1947) or the 
White Terror, and for several decades it was a taboo to even mention it (Dreyer, 
2003). As a result of 228, martial law was imposed in 1948 and lasted for 38 years 
until it was lifted in 1987, creating a tremendous impact on Taiwanese modern his-
tory. Under Chiang’s oppressive control, Mainlanders and the local people were 
segregated not only residentially but also vocationally, with Mainlanders taking 
over positions of power in economic, political, cultural and educational domains 
and continuously discriminating against local people’s languages and cultures. 
The gulf between Mainlanders and local people was deep, and Taiwan was effec-
tively turned into a dual society that categorized people as either waishengren or 
benshengren (Huang, 2000). 
The KMT reinstated the title of ROC in Taiwan, and assumed that soon it would 
be re-established on the mainland. It also instituted several ambitious nation-
building programs to emphasize a common Chinese identity; language played 
a critical role in this effort (Dreyer, 2003). In terms of status planning, the KMT 
continued the language policy of the ROC and thus, Mandarin Chinese became 
the national language (guoyu 國語) and official language for Taiwan. Just one year 
after KMT’s takeover, Japanese was banned completely in 1946 to eliminate the 
Japanese influence in Taiwan. In 1948, the KMT declared that local languages were 
inappropriate for academic and cultural communication (Tsao, 2000). Since then, 
strenuous effort had been taken to emphasize a common Chinese identity through 
the use of Mandarin Chinese and the suppression of local languages (Chen, 2006; 
Dreyer, 2003; Scott & Tiun, 2007; Tsao, 2000). 
As for acquisition planning, Mandarin became the sole medium of instruc-
tion and the use of local languages at school was prohibited. Children who 
attempted to speak local languages were subjected to physical punishment 
and fines (Dreyer, 2003). In 1975, the passage of the Broadcast Bill strictly con-
strained the use of local languages in the media (Huang, 2000). Budgets for film 
and TV program production favored those produced in Mandarin, and actors 
or actresses who spoke Holo or Hakka in Mandarin-produced films usually 
took the roles of maids, street vendors, or construction workers, creating an im-
pression that only people of low socioeconomic status spoke those languages 
(Dreyer, 2003; Huang, 1993; Scott & Tiun, 2007). 
This restrictive language policy not only greatly weakened the vitality of local 
languages (some varieties of aboriginal languages even disappeared, see Li, 1994), 
but also undermined local and ethnic identity (Tse, 2000). The desire to create a 
shared Chinese identity was also reflected in the school curricula, which focused 
on the history of empires and dynasties in China rather than the history of Tai-
wan, and on Chinese rather than Taiwanese culture. For instance, students studied 
Beijing opera instead of Taiwanese opera or traditional Taiwanese puppetry. The 
languages and cultures of ethnic minorities, though they received a great deal of 
attention, were constrained to the minority groups on the mainland (i.e., Tibetan 
or Mongolian), rather than the Austronesian minorities in Taiwan (Dreyer, 2003). 
Cheng (1990) argues that the oppressive policies disadvantaged local people who 
did not speak Mandarin Chinese and were a mechanism for the dominant elite 
(i.e., Mainlanders) to maintain control over the majority. 
Language played a central role in both the Japanization movement and KMT’s 
Chinaization movement. Billing (1995, p. 29) points out that creation of a national 
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hegemony often involves a hegemony of language, which ignores the diversity 
and variety of the languages spoken within the existing ecology. In a similar vein, 
Blackledge (2008, p. 31) discusses how language polices are important means of 
social control used by nation-states to define “who is in” and “who is out.” LPP 
during Japanese colonization and KMT control was deliberately constructed to 
advantage some individuals at the expense of others.  
Post-1987 Democratization Effects on LPP
The year 1987 was particularly important in Taiwanese modern history as mar-
tial law was lifted that year. From 1987 to the present day, Taiwan has been under 
democratization in many aspects of politics, society and education. For instance, the 
first opposition party, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), which was predominately 
composed of Holo speakers, was established in 1986 and tolerated under the repeal 
of martial law. People in Taiwan have elected their legislative representatives in local 
governments since 1989 (Huang, 2000). Democratization also led to the drive toward 
more Taiwanization in many aspects. After Lee Teng-hui succeeded President Chiang 
Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, after his death in 1988, and became the first Tai-
wanese-born president as well as the chairman of the KMT, Taiwan not only went 
through liberalization but also started to establish its own identity, distinct from that 
of China. Lee proposed the term “New Taiwanese” to refer to people living in Taiwan 
and sharing the same fate (Dreyer, 2003, p.400) and replaced the earlier political slogan 
“Fighting back against the Mainland” with “Footing in Taiwan, taking an interna-
tional view” (S. Chen, 2006).  To achieve this end, Lee took several measures during 
his twelve-year presidency. For instance, place of birth replaced the designation of an-
cestral origins in China on the identity, highlighting ones’ roots in Taiwan and erasing 
the distinction between those who came to Taiwan long before the KMT troops and 
those who came with them. This was the period often characterized as bentuhua (本土
化)1, translated as “Taiwanization,” “localization,” or “indigenization” (S. Chen, 2006; 
Jacobs, 2005; Scott & Tiun, 2007). 
Taiwanese became aware of their linguistic rights to use mother tongues as 
Taiwan moved toward further democratization and Taiwanization. Although 
Mandarin remained the national language and a de facto lingua franca, much at-
tention was progressively paid to local languages in educational and political do-
mains. Pupils were no longer punished for speaking local languages at school, and 
restrictions on public use of local languages were also repealed. In fact, President 
Lee often gave his speeches in Holo. Hakka people were also united to ask for 
more language rights, and in 1988, Hakka people launched a “Return our mother 
tongue” movement to demand more mother tongue education and mass media 
coverage. Scott and Tiun (2007) argue that language ideology gradually shifted 
from viewing local languages as problems that threaten a common Chinese iden-
tity to viewing them as rights applied to all people living in Taiwan (cf. Ruiz, 1984). 
The language-as-rights orientation gradually became crystallized in education as 
several DPP members, who became representatives in some local governments 
in the 1989 island-wide election, pushed for more mother tongue education. The 
push for mother tongue education gained support from the ethnic communities 
and local educators, and together they repeatedly pressured the KMT govern-
ment. In 1993, the Minister of the Interior acknowledged that past language policy 
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was repressive and a mistake, and the Minister of Education announced that local 
languages could be offered as electives at the elementary level. Three local govern-
ments, all led by the DPP, actually were ahead of the central government’s initia-
tive in providing mother tongue education. Illan County, Tapei County, and Ping-
tung County had already started to offer a variety of mother tongue education in 
1990 (Dreyer, 2003).  In the late 1990s, many more elementary schools started to 
teach mother tongues (Huang, 2000; Scott & Tiun, 2007). In addition, school curri-
cula paid less attention to the history of China and focused more on that of Taiwan 
(Dreyer, 2003). The language policy of this time moved from “Mandarin-Only” to 
“Mandarin-Plus,” although Mandarin still remained the only official language of 
Taiwan (P. Chen, 2001; Scott & Tiun, 2007).
English Language Policy
Discussion of Taiwanese language ecology is not complete without reference 
to the development and evolution of English language policy in Taiwan. The KMT 
continued the foreign-language-in-education policy implemented in China in 
1912, in which English was a required subject in middle schools (Tse, 1987, cited in 
Chen, 2006, p. 327). Following the introduction of the Joint College Entrance Ex-
amination in 1954, which assigned English as one of the core test subjects, English 
became the only required foreign language subject in middle schools in Taiwan in 
1968. Since then, teaching and learning English in Taiwan has been test-driven and 
focused on grammar (Sommers, 2003). At the same time, as Taiwan’s economy has 
become more dependent on exports, the public demand for English education has 
also increased. 
Although many local governments started to offer English education to their 
pupils in elementary schools starting in 1998, some scholars (e.g., Sommers, 2003) 
point out that the demand for more authentic English education has been general-
ly met by private companies specializing in English, rather than by schools. Due to 
the lifting of martial law in 1987, the number of private educational companies has 
skyrocketed, and many of them hire foreign teachers as instructors. This private 
English educational phenomenon led Sommers (2003) to challenge scholars  (e.g., 
S. Chen, 2001; Tsao, 2000) who situated the development and spread of English in 
Taiwan mainly in the larger scope of state-controlled language planning, arguing 
instead that private education has played an influential role in language educa-
tion in Taiwan. Indeed, the issue of growing disparity in pupils’ access to English 
education, with pupils from more affluent families being able to start their English 
education earlier in private after-school programs has been one impetus for the 
implementation of nation-wide English education at the elementary levels in 2001 
(Law, 2004; Ministry of Education [MOE], 1998). 
A large-scale educational reform was launched in the mid-1990s, which was 
partly driven by the internal democratic process and partly by external economic 
demand (Law, 2004). Democratization and liberalization processes have pushed 
for more decentralized power distribution during policy-making and policy-im-
plementation processes, and globalization of the economy has also drawn increas-
ing concern about how Taiwan might gain a competitive edge over other coun-
tries. As a result, the Taiwan Commission on Education Reform (CER), composed 
of elites with an international outlook, was created as a mediating agency between 
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the government and civil society in 1994. Based on suggestions from the CER, 
which prioritized the need to prepare pupils for the global economy and foster 
appreciation for multiculturalism, the MOE developed new curricula (i.e., Nine-
Year Integrated Curriculum) for elementary and junior secondary schools (MOE, 
2000). Under the new curriculum, learning Chinese, English and local languages 
are all combined as “language subject learning,” the first time that English and 
local languages have become required subjects in elementary schools (Tsao, 2000). 
This language-in-education policy is the realization of concurrent promotion of 
internationalization and Taiwanization (S. Chen, 2006; Scott & Tiun, 2007; Yang, 
2001). Because the new curriculum was not implemented until 2001 when the DPP 
became the governing party, more discussion on language education will be pro-
vided in the next section.  
Contemporary Modern Democratic Era (2000-2008)
As Taiwan moved toward a more democratic society, Taiwanese were able to 
vote for their own president beginning in 1996. It is not surprising that Lee Teng-
hui, the chairman of the KMT and president since 1988, won the first direct presi-
dential election as the KMT had been in power since 1949 and had maintained 
most of the political, economic and educational resources. Candidates from the 
once opposition party DPP, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu, won the second direct 
presidential election four years later. This marked the end of more than half a cen-
tury of KMT rule in Taiwan. In 2004, Chen and Lu were re-elected by a margin of 
only 0.22% of valid votes over their opponents who were chairmen from the KMT 
and the People First Party. 
The DPP has been a Taiwanese-centered party since its inception, and thus 
it has undertaken great effort to further Taiwanization during their governance. 
Similar to its earlier counterparts (i.e., the Japanese and the KMT), languages have 
played a prominent role during the DPP’s Taiwanization process. In terms of sta-
tus planning, the DPP proposed granting national status to Holo, Hakka and other 
Austronesian languages when the party was established in 1986. Huang (2000) 
posits that the proposal stressed the shared struggle for independence across dif-
ferent ethnic groups and objected to the degradation of local languages under the 
Mandarin-only language policy. When the DPP became the ruling party in 2000, it 
attempted to realize this proposal. 
In 2003, the MOE proposed the “Language Equality Law” draft, which in-
cluded all languages of the four ethnic groups, namely Holo, Hakka, Austronesian 
languages and Mandarin Chinese as national languages. In this draft, the name of 
Mandarin Chinese was changed from national language (guoyu) to Chinese lan-
guage (huayu), as the draft intended to include more languages as national lan-
guages. Moreover, Taiwanese was included in parentheses after Holo, and Holo 
was written in Romanized alphabets rather than Chinese characters (河洛). No 
further reasons were given to explain such a choice, although both the names of 
Taiwanese and Holo have been used by ordinary Taiwanese to refer to the same 
language2. Eventually, this draft was not passed in the Legislative Assembly since 
the DPP was only a minority party. In addition, referring to only Holo as Tai-
wanese in the draft incurred criticism of de-Chinaization and language chauvin-
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ism mainly from the KMT, but also from Hakka and Austronesian speakers (Liou, 
2007; National Policy Foundation, 2003). The draft was described as “creating fake 
inequality though the rhetoric of language equality” (National Policy Founda-
tion, 2003). Since some local people interpreted the draft as making the use of 14 
languages necessary in all public and educational domains and thus increasing 
enormous financial expense of the country, the DPP was thought to “make a fuss 
out of nothing,” “complicate the simple issue,” or “introduce a policy that will 
hurt the economy at the already difficult times of Taiwanese economy” (National 
Policy Foundation, 2003). In 2007, the Council for Cultural Affairs took over the 
role of the MOE, drafting the “National Language Development Law” and chang-
ing the focus from officialization of local languages to the preservation of local 
languages/cultures, and maintenance of linguistic diversity and equity in Taiwan 
(Council for Cultural Affairs, 2007). The decision to shift the focus from an orienta-
tion that views language as a right to language as a cultural artifact to be preserved 
might indicate DPP’s changing strategy in response to the public rejection of the 
first draft that aimed to politically elevate all local languages. Currently, the new 
draft is still pending in the Legislative Assembly and thus, Mandarin Chinese is 
still called the national language (guoyu) in Taiwan. 
The new educational curriculum, although conceived in the later years of the 
KMT governance, was crystallized during the DPP period and has continued to 
address issues of acquisition planning. Since 2001, all elementary school students 
across Taiwan have been required to complete at least one session of mother tongue, 
and all fifth and sixth graders to complete at least one session of English. Although 
mother tongue and English education both have faced some common obstacles 
(e.g., the lack of qualified teachers), mother tongue education has received less 
governmental support than English education (S. Chen, 2006; Scott & Tiun, 2007). 
In addition, issues of graphization, standardization, and modernization have 
emerged during the implementation of mother tongue education. Graphization 
refers to the provision of writing systems for unwritten languages (Cooper, 1989, 
p. 126). The implementation of mother tongue education confronts the question 
of which phonetic system best represents local languages since existing Chinese 
characters cannot represent many words in the local languages. Several Roman-
ized phonetic systems have been used for local languages, some developed by 
western missionaries and others by local linguists. There has been little public 
attempt to unify them, but the provision of national mother tongue education in 
the elementary schools has pressed the government to adopt one phonetic system 
that can apply to all local languages, making teaching and publishing easier (Su, 
Zhang, Zheng, Wang, & Xia, 2000). 
The debate over which phonetic system both best represents local languages 
and does not interfere with pupils’ English language learning at a younger age 
turned out to be a divisive issue among different political parties. The DPP favored 
the locally-developed Tongyong Pinyin, as it was more intuitive and comparable 
to other Romanized phonetic systems currently in use (Zhu, 2000), whereas the 
KMT favored the PRC-developed Hanyu Pinyin as it already had received inter-
national recognition (Yang, 2002). The debate soon became highly ideological. 
Advocates for Tongyong maintained that the adoption of Hanyu would inhibit 
Taiwanese’ language autonomy, but such arguments were criticized by their oppo-
nents as simply ideological rather than educational. After a prolonged and heated 
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debates among scholars, practitioners and politicians, the DPP eventually adopted 
Tongyong with some room left for local practitioners to decide what is best for 
their students.  The DPP’s opponents attacked this decision as prioritizing political 
agenda over educational concern. Some local governments under the KMT (e.g., 
Taipei city, Taichung city) explicitly stated that they would not follow this policy, 
and thus Hanyu would be taught to their pupils and used on road signs (Yang, 
2002). 
Another obstacle specific to mother tongue education is related to standard-
ization. Those developing teaching materials for Holo and Hakka have confronted 
issues related to which variety should be used as the standard in textbooks. In 
general, the government has not attempted to introduce a standard for either Holo 
or Hakka, but instead emphasizes that teaching should be sensitive to and based 
on regional usages (MOE, 2000). Finally, due to the past oppressive language poli-
cies, local languages did not develop vocabulary in academic and official domains. 
This is related to modernization, which refers to “the process whereby a language 
becomes an appropriate medium of communication for modern topics and forms 
of discourse” (Cooper, 1989, p. 149). Scott and Tiun (2007) argue that the lack of 
appropriate vocabulary in mother tongues creates a vicious cycle as it poses chal-
lenges to expanding their functions and promoting their status. There seems to be 
little public support for any mother tongue to go beyond the level of basic literacy 
learning, and Huang (2000) suspects that the goal of the mother tongue education 
is less about competence in the languages, and more about the MOE’s general 
“get-to-know-your-native-land” educational goal (p. 146). 
It should be noted that one important factor deserves special attention in the 
discussion of language policy implementation during the DPP era, that is, the 
tension between central and local governments. Discussed earlier, as Taiwan has 
moved to a more democratic country since the late 1990s, local governments also 
have growing autonomy in deciding what to offer their residents (Law, 2004). The 
educational reform launched in the late 1990s has underscored the market mecha-
nism in the educational process, and thus it has also forced the central govern-
ments to reduce their control over education. As a result, children’s educational 
rights as well as parents’ rights to choose the adequate education for their children 
have been emphasized (Yang, 2001).
This changing relationship between central government, local governments 
and parents is important for the discussion of LPP in Taiwan. For instance, 
although English was mandated as a required subject for all fifth and sixth 
graders across Taiwan in 2001, some more affluent local governments had al-
ready offered it prior to 2001. The capital city, Taipei, for example, had offered 
English to their third graders and above since 1998, and to their first graders 
and above since 2002. Under this new policy, first and second graders in Taipei 
City only received one session of mother tongue education but two sessions of 
English education. Several other local governments soon followed this policy. 
This exemplifies Cooper’s point (1989, p. 106) that in countries where social, 
economic and political resources are centered in the capital cities, their deci-
sions of allocating new functions to a linguistic system (in this case, allocating 
the function of a school subject to English) usually diffuses from center to pe-
riphery, ultimately contributing to language spread.  
In view of the growing disparity between local governments’ financial power 
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to offer English education, the MOE extended English to third graders and above 
beginning in 2003, but it also made several public announcements to emphasize 
that Taiwanese language-in-education policy prioritizes mother tongue over Eng-
lish and that it is inappropriate for young pupils, specifically pupils under third 
grade, to receive more English education than mother tongue education (MOE, 
2006). Moreover, the MOE claimed to reduce funding for those local governments 
who insist on providing more or earlier English education to their elementary 
school students. The MOE was blamed, however, for neglecting the growing pa-
rental demands for more English education, and for eagerly inculcating a Taiwan-
ese identity through mother tongue education (e.g., Oladejo, 2006; Sommers, 2004). 
The tensions between central and local governments and parents in Taiwan with 
regard to English education also illustrate Ricento and Hornberger’s (1996) onion 
metaphor, describing different layers (or levels) of agents in LPP, and shed light on 
their interaction. Ricento and Hornberger also highlight the role of states in LPP as 
they have the power to levy taxes or to regulate behaviors through various edicts; 
thus in many contexts, policy guidelines at the level of the central government 
might be modified or not even implemented at state or local levels. In the case of 
Taiwan, affluent cities/counties usually can (or have to) attend to what their resi-
dents ask for (i.e., more English education) since their residents tend to pay more 
tax to the local governments. In these regions, the power of central government 
might diminish to a greater extent and thus the influence of local government 
becomes more obvious.  
To conclude, the DPP era was particularly active in LPP formulation. Local 
languages received the greatest official and educational attention in Taiwanese 
history due to internal democratization and Taiwanization of the society. Promo-
tion of local languages was not only a response to growing public concerns of 
linguistic human rights but also linked to promotion of Taiwanese identity(ies) 
in constrast with the earlier monothilic Chinese identity that was imposed upon 
the local people. In addition, the Taiwanese export-dependent economy also re-
sulted in a growing systematic support of English education, as English replaced 
Japanese and became the most prominent foreign language in the local language 
ecology. Lastly, agencies other than the central government became increasingly 
important in the LPP, leading to variations in the policy implementation. 
Into the Future
Throughout the paper, I have aimed to situate LPP in Taiwan within a larger 
sociocultural and political context and examine how different languages have in-
teracted with one another in the local language ecology. In the remaining para-
graphs, I identify some important factors that will influence future LPP in Taiwan, 
and following Kaplan and Baldauf (2008), I suggest that future LPP will benefit 
from a detailed and nuanced analysis of the local language ecology.
First of all, there has been a growing number of immigrants from Southeast 
Asia in Taiwan since the late 1990s. Intermarriages between Taiwanese and foreign 
nationals have increased so drastically that foreign nationals are called “the fifth 
ethnic group” in governmental discourse (Huang, 2006). The international mar-
riages are highly gendered since over 92% of them are Taiwanese males married to 
LaNguagE PLaNNiNg aNd PoLicy iN TaiWaN
foreign females (Ministry of the Interior, 2007), and the Taiwanese males who have 
married foreign nationals are usually from the bottom of the socio-economic stra-
tum (Hsia, 2001). The majority of the foreign nationals are from China (62.74%), 
and the rest are from Vietnam (19.72%), Indonesia (6.57%), Thailand (2.25%), Phil-
ippines (1.54%), or Cambodia (1.15%).
 Schools have also started to experience this demographic and ethnolinguistic 
change. Since 2004, students from international marriages in the elementary and 
secondary schools have experienced a 30% growth per year (MOE, 2007). Public 
media and anecdotes from teachers often portray these students as lagging be-
hind other students. Although several governmental measures have been taken 
to address the socioeconomic status and underachievement among these students 
(e.g., giving young children priority to be enrolled in public kindergartens, offer-
ing elementary students after-school tutoring, giving parents parenting education 
etc.) (MOE, 2005), future LPP should address this diverse group’s unique linguis-
tic needs at school and in society. 
Secondly, as Taiwan’s economy becomes more globalized, so do its educational 
policies. For instance, some local counties have developed “English villages” with 
English-only environments based on the Korean model, and three English villag-
es have been established across Taiwan since 2006. Additionally, Taipei County 
educational officials decided to increase Chinese and English instruction to their 
pupils starting September, 2008, after they examined the curriculum in Singapore, 
Hong Kong and China and found that pupils in these three polities spend more 
time learning Chinese and English. Kaplan and Baldauf (2008) remind us that lan-
guages interact with and affect one another not only within, but also across poli-
ties. They also state:
Language planning must recognize…that language modification may not 
be susceptible to containment within a particular nation-state or other en-
tity that may be isolated for the purpose of discussion but that in truth 
always remains embedded in a larger context. Rather, the language plan 
may cause a ripple effect in proximate communities, in nation-states, and 
across a region (Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997, p. 269).  
As LPP in Taiwan has experienced a ripple effect originating in its nearby poli-
ties, future LPP in Taiwan should recognize that LPP can no longer be narrowly 
defined within Taiwanese social and political circles, but is embedded within even 
larger contexts. As can be seen in the case of English villages and increasing Eng-
lish/Chinese instructional time, local governments look for overseas experiences 
that can address their local needs.
Lastly, the local ecology has inevitably been influenced by the KMT’s victory in 
the presidential and legislative election in 2008, putting an end to the DPP’s 8-year 
governance of Taiwan. The DPP’s failure in the legislative and presidential elec-
tion in 2008 can be understood as Taiwanese’s rejection of the DPP’s downplaying 
of domestic economic issues and its over-emphasis on a pro-independence agenda 
(Open CRS, 2008). As a party that does not favor de jure independence but instead 
supports eventual reunification with China, the KMT is unlikely to challenge the 
official status of Mandarin Chinese or to grant other local languages co-official 
status. In terms of language-in-education policy, it remains to be seen if there will 
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be any change with respect to mother tongue and English education in the elemen-
tary schools. It should be noted that the incumbent president Ma Ying-jeou had 
been the former Taipei City mayor from 1998 to 2006, a time during which he ad-
vanced English education to all first graders in Taipei, thereby allotting more time 
to English than to mother tongue. With respect to the battle between Tongyong 
and Hanyu pinyin, Hanyu has replaced Tongyong as the model for English-Chi-
nese translation in both central and local governments. No funding is available 
for local governments adopting Tongyong (He, 2008). As Ricento and Hornberger 
(1996, p. 410) remind us, guidelines proposed in one administration might not be 
enforced by those that follow.
Moreover, since the KMT has become the ruling party, it has tried to normalize 
economic relations between Taiwan and China (e.g., cross-straits direct charter flights). 
Related to LLP, one current KMT economic policy has indirectly triggered concerns 
over the simplified written Chinese used in China3 and the traditional written Chinese 
used in Taiwan. In the past, only Chinese people who have established permanent res-
idency in a foreign country or who first travel through a third country were allowed 
to visit Taiwan. A new policy has aimed to boost local tourism by allowing Chinese 
residents to visit Taiwan since July of 2008. Many local governments and tourism in-
dustries have reacted positively to this policy, and a number of them have also drafted 
menus or tour guides in simplified Chinese (Lan, 2008). However, President Ma did 
not encourage the use of simplified Chinese only for the sake of business concerns. 
He argued that Taiwanese people can expose Chinese tourists to the beauty of the 
traditional version of Chinese, and said he hoped that all Chinese used the traditional 
characters in the future. However, the business sector saw this proposal as unrealistic 
(Lian, 2008). Although simplified Chinese is not likely to become part of Taiwanese’s 
reading or writing systems in a short period of time since there have been far fewer 
numbers of Chinese tourists than expected, there are growing concerns about the pres-
ervation of traditional written Chinese in response to the widespread use of simplified 
Chinese around the world, especially in the emerging field of teaching Chinese as a 
foreign language4. The Executive Yuan proposed in December of 2008 that traditional 
Chinese be nominated as a World Cultural Heritage language because it represents 
an important treasure the Chinese ancestors left to the world (Taiwan intends, 2008). 
Ironically, since Taiwan is not an official member of the United Nation, it must seek 
help from China to initiate the nomination, and thus how both countries will reach 
consensus on the proposal remains unknown (Taiwan plans, 2008). 
Meanwhile, President Ma’s attitude toward simplified and traditional Chinese 
seems to have changed dramatically since his last public comments on this issue 
six months earlier. In a meeting with delegates from the Chinese Consolidated Be-
nevolent Associations in the U.S. in June of 2009, he proposed “Reading traditional 
[Chinese] and writing simplified [Chinese]” as future teaching practices for over-
seas Taiwanese-funded Chinese weekend schools, which still insist teaching only 
traditional Chinese in the face of growing demand for teaching simplified Chinese. 
The President further suggested that traditional Chinese be used in all printed ma-
terials and urged the Chinese government to consider such a proposal. The DPP 
criticized the President for ignoring the fact that traditional Chinese has been local 
Taiwanese’ writing practices and that his proposal was evidence of “surrendering 
to China” (Wang, Lee, Lin, Hu, & Huang, 2009). On the other hand, local scholars 
interpreted the President’s proposal as a reaction to the bottleneck of overseas Chi-
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nese schools, which have only taught the Taiwanese variety of Chinese (i.e., traditional 
Chinese) in the face of Chinese government’s systematic promotion of simplified Chi-
nese learning abroad. As China established the National Office of Teaching Chinese 
as a Foreign Language (NOCFL) in 1987 to promote simplified Chinese learning and 
teaching abroad through various avenues (e.g., the establishment of a Chinese Pro-
ficiency Test for Foreigners, cultural exchanges and tours, or sending Chinese guest 
teachers abroad, to name a few; see a more nuanced discussion of the institutionalized 
promotion of Chinese language and culture abroad in Lo Bianco, 2007), it has become 
increasingly difficult for those overseas Chinese schools which have taught traditional 
Chinese to overlook the demand for and the rise of simplified Chinese learning and 
teaching. Therefore, it is suspected that the President Ma’s proposal was the response 
the challenges faced by the overseas Taiwanese-affiliated Chinese schools. It can be 
expected that future LPP in Taiwan will witness more frequent and direct interactions 
with China due to the more amiable political and economic relations between Taiwan 
and China under the KMT governance. However, the KMT will inevitably have to 
deal with issues related to Taiwanese autonomy during its relation-building process 
with China. 
Conclusion
This paper has tried to embed the LPP in Taiwan within larger sociocultural 
and political contexts. The metaphor of language ecology is helpful to examine 
languages within and beyond the local ecology and to capture the complexity and 
interrelatedness among languages. Kaplan and Baldauf (2008, p. 50) argue that 
the first step to a successful LPP is a detailed understanding of the local language 
ecology. This paper has aimed to capture the system of interacting languages in 
Taiwan and it is hoped that the analysis presented here might be relevant to future 
LPP in Taiwan.
Notes
1Jacobs (2005) discusses the challenges of translating bentuhua 本土化 to English. 
He supports the use of Taiwanization over localization and indigenization 
because the focus of bentuhua is on Taiwan as opposed to China or the rest of 
the world. He argues that localization as a translation might wrongly reinforce 
the Chinese view of Taiwan as a “local” government, and indigenization often is 
understood to include only the aboriginals rather than Taiwan as a whole. 
2The government did not use the term “Southern Min,” but used Holo to refer 
to the 1st minority language spoken by many of Taiwanese. The intention might 
be to either decrease the relation with China since Southern Min usually refers 
to the dialect spoken in the southern Fujian province of China (Liou, 2007), or to 
emphasize that Taiwanese encompasses all languages of other ethnic groups in 
Taiwan (Scott and Tiun, 2007).
3The writing script was simplified and a phonetic alphabet, Hanyu Pinyin, was 
developed to enhance literacy in China upon the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949.
4Many Southeast Asia countries (e.g., Singapore and Malaysia) where traditional 
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Chinese had dominated for years have switched to simplified Chinese. 
Traditional Chinese has been used in Hong Kong, but simplified Chinese 
gains much visibility since its reunification with China in 1997. The majority of 
overseas Chinese education and Chinese foreign language education also have 
adopted simplified Chinese.  
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